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Communal Confl ict in Indonesia: Contagious or Latent Issues?
 Sujarwoto•
Abstract
This paper examines socio, economic, and political factors of communal confl ict in Indonesia and 
investigates how communal confl ict is spatially correlated across districts. Data comes from the 
2008 Village Potential Census (Podes) and offi  cial statistics which consist of communal confl ict 
information across all Indonesia’s districts (N districts = 465). Results from spatial dependent 
model show that communal confl ict to be spatially dependent through latent factors, meaning 
that communal confl ict clusters because of clustering of latent factors within district. Rather than 
religious and ethnic heterogeneity,  communal confl ict is positively associated with poverty, 
economic inequality, elite capture, and weak capacity of districts to manage fi scal resources.
Keywords: 
communal confl ict; spatial dependent;  contagious;  latent issue.
Abstract
Penelitian ini mengkaji faktor sosial, ekonomi dan politik sengketa komunal yang terjadi di Indonesia 
dan menguji bagaimana sengketa komunal secara spasial terhubung antarkabupaten atau kota di seluruh 
Indonesia. Data bersumber dari Sensus Potensi Desa (Podes) tahun 2008 dan laporan statistik pemerintah 
yang berisi informasi mengenai sengketa komunal di seluruh kabupaten/kota di Indonesia (N kabupaten/
kota= 465). Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa sengketa komunal di Indonesia terjadi akibat adanya faktor-
faktor laten di dalam kabupaten/kota. Dibandingkan dengan keragaman agama dan etnis, sengketa komunal 
memiliki hubungan kuat dengan kemiskinan, ketimpangan ekonomi, elite capture dan lemahnya kapasitas 
kabupaten/kota dalam mengelola sumber-sumber fi skal daerah. 
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Introduction
Efforts to maintain collective security 
are at the heart of human history: from the 
earliest times, the recognition that human 
safety depends on collaboration has been a 
motivating factor for the formation of village 
communities, cities and nation-states. The 
21st century was dominated by interstate 
communal confl icts and wars which threats 
human security and well-being across Africa, 
Middle East and Asia (UNDP, 2011). World 
Development Reports 2011 titled “Conflict, 
Security and Development” reports that deaths 
from communal confl icts and wars, while still 
exacting an unacceptable toll, are one-quarter 
of what they were in the 1980’s. Violence and 
confl ict have not been banished: one in four 
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Not only because ethnicity and religious issues, 
but also there are a lot of historical, political and 
economic factors that are lying at the root of 
these communal confl icts (Klinken, 2007).       
Studies on communal conflicts in 
Indonesia aft er the 1998 economic crisis have 
been linked to the role of political crisis and 
decentralisation reform in the early 1999 
in producing communal conflicts (see for 
example, Murshed et al., 2009; Welsh, 2008; 
Klinken, 2007). All these studies documented 
that decentralisation reforms were associated 
with communal conflicts in some places. 
For example, Klinken (2007) documented 
democracy transition in Indonesia was far less 
peaceful than is often though. He reported 
that democracy transition in the country was 
followed by widespread communal confl icts 
which threatened more than 10,000 lives of 
people across archipelago.  However, Murshed 
et al. (2009) found that routine social violence 
in Java is negatively associated with the impact 
of fi scal decentralisation and the size of local 
government. Fiscal decentralisation reduces 
routine social confl icts during decentralisation 
but it is only with applied to richer districts. 
Despite the fruitful results, prior studies 
have several limitations. First, most of them 
link the signifi cant outbreak of violence during 
the political transition with the decentralisation 
reform directly, implying that decentralisation 
was a cause of the violence (see Klinken, 2007; 
Welsh, 2008). Second, from a temporal variation 
perspective at the national level, these studies 
ignore the spatial variations in communal 
conflicts following local political transition 
and decentralisation reform. Ignoring spatial 
dimension of communal confl ict may result 
in bias estimate in which the results unable 
to control unobserved factors across districts 
that may relate to widespread communal 
conflicts incidence (Morenoff & Sampson, 
1997).  Third, some of prior studies used limited 
geographical coverages. For example, Murshed 
et al. (2009) study only covered districts within 
people on the planet, more than 1.5 billion, 
live in fragile and confl ict-aff ected states or 
in countries with very high levels of criminal 
violence (UNDP, 2011).  Yet, insecurity not only 
remains, it has become a primary social, political 
and economic development challenge in 
confl ict-aff ected countries across Africa, Middle 
East and Asia. While much of the world has 
made rapid progress in reducing poverty in the 
past 60 years, areas characterized by repeated 
cycles of political and criminal violence are 
being left  far behind, their economic growth 
compromised and their human development 
indicators stagnant (World Bank, 2011). 
The history of communal conflicts in 
developing countries’ context has put Indonesia 
in the list particularly aft er the 1998 political 
and economic crisis. During that period, the 
incidence of communal confl icts was not only 
substantially increase in number but also spread 
across districts of the country archipelagos. 
The government offi  cial statistics reports the 
incidence of communal confl ict increases from 
12 percent between 1990 and 1995 to 67 percent 
between 1997 and 2014 with a large percentage 
occurred between 1997 and 2002 (BPS, 2015). 
In 1997, the communal conflict between 
indigenous Dayaks and some indigenous 
Malays against the immigrant Madurese 
group in West Kalimantan caused around 
4,500 people death and 670,000 displaced (BPS, 
2011). In 1999, there was a confl ict going in 
Poso, Sulawesi. The worst episode was this past 
spring when there were 300 people killed in the 
confl ict between Christian-Muslim (BPS, 2010). 
Further, the confl ict in the Moluccas between 
1999-2002 where about 4,000 people have 
been killed in Christian-Muslim fi ghting, and 
about 500,000 displaces were the worst of the 
confl icts that Indonesia is facing but even there 
it is almost a misnomer to see it as arising from 
some long-seated religious dispute (BPS, 2011). 
Moreover, there were also periodic eruptions of 
communal confl ict in Lombok, Eastern Bali, in 
Kupang in West Timor, in in West and East Java. 
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Java Island and therefore the fi ndings can only 
be generalized within social confl icts across 
districts in this Island. 
This paper aims to address prior studies 
limitations by examining the spatial aspects of 
sub-national communal confl ict in Indonesia. 
The study assesses political, ethno-cultural, 
institution, and economic pathways of 
communal confl ict in Indonesia and examine 
how communal confl ict is spatially correlated 
across districts. Four research questions 
are addressed in this paper: How is spatial 
distribution of communal confl ict incidence 
across districts in Indonesia? In what ways 
communal conflicts occur across districts? 
What are the risk factors associated with 
communal confl icts incidence across districts? 
Does communal conflicts across districts 
contagious or latent issues? In order to answer 
these questions the study employs the Village 
Potential Census Data or Podes data 2008. The 
data consists of more than 7,200 villages across 
all 465 districts in the country. Spatial linear 
regression analysis is used to test whether 
communal conflict is contagious or latent 
issues. Because this study examines communal 
confl icts and its determinants, the next section 
discusses a literature review on communal 
confl icts and its determinants.  Then, it discusses 
the spatial aspects of community confl icts.
Understanding Communal Confl icts 
Determinants
Communal confl ict in this paper is defi ned 
as violent confl ict between non-state groups 
that are organised along a shared communal 
identity (Galtung, 1965). The groups involved 
are non-state groups, meaning that neither actor 
controls the state and armed forces (although 
state actors may be involved as an important 
supporting actor in a communal confl ict). These 
groups are often organised along a shared 
communal identity, meaning that they are not 
formally organized rebel groups or militias 
but that the confrontation takes place along 
the line of group identities. Following Gurr 
(2000), communal identity is conceptualised 
as subjective group identifi cation based on a 
common history, a common culture or common 
core values. In this definition, communal 
identity also refers to ethnic or religious 
identity.
Studies to understand determinants of 
communal conflicts have well documented 
(Sambanis, 2004; Coppel, 2006; Stewart, 2008; 
Baron et al., 2009). In general, there are four 
theoretical approaches which explain the 
prevalence of communal conflicts and the 
likelihood of it escalating into violence. Table 
1 summarizes these approaches. 
Table 1. 
Four Approaches for Understanding 
Communal Confl icts Determinants
Approaches Basic Assumptions
Ethno-cultural Communal conflicts are 
rooted in the dynamics of 
diff erence within inter-group 
relations where groups saw 
themselves as diff erent due 
to ethnic and culture.
Politics Communal conflicts occur 
due to elite political interest 
and unequal state policy 
f a v o u r i n g  o n e  e t h n i c 
community.
Institutional Communal confl icts occurs 
due to the weakness of 
institution such as weak 
law enforcement and norms 
governing life
Economic Communal conflicts are 
rooted within economic 
factors such as economic 
rivalries and supply of public 
goods, poverty, and economic 
inequality.
Sources: Sambanis, 2004; Coppel, 2006; Stewart, 
2008; Baron et al., 2009.
First, ethno-cultural approach which 
argues that communal confl icts are rooted in 
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the dynamics of diff erence within inter-group 
relations where groups saw themselves as 
diff erent due to ethnic and cultural background 
(Hegree et. al, 2001). Such diff erences are not 
static and given. In Indonesia for example Baron 
et al. (2009) found such identities morphed 
based on a range of factors including population 
movements, the political motivations of 
religious and ethnic leaders, and the extent to 
which religious and ethnic common institutions 
(for example places of worship) existed. 
Second, institutional approach which 
argue that communal conflicts occurs due 
to the weakness of institution such as weak 
law enforcement and norms governing life 
within community. In the absence of a formal 
rule of law, these customary rules sometimes 
clashed with each other and with formal state 
legislation (Baron et al., 2009). In Indonesia, 
for example, communal conflicts over land 
oft en occur due to diff erent kinship groups had 
diff erent rules and understandings of how land 
should be allocated. This is followed by lack of 
capacity of local leaders and state institution 
particularly security sector to make and to 
enforce decisions. Hence, the inability of the 
state to control confl ict becomes the pathway 
of how small protests and demonstrations may 
end up in large community confl ict.
Third, political approach which argue that 
communal confl icts occurs due to unequal state 
policy favoring one ethnic community (Horowitz, 
1985). In Indonesia, for example, Java has 
dominated government structure for long time 
and therefore state policies in favor Java ethnic 
rather than others. In other case, the competition 
over political representations also gives a reason 
for confl ict, in which some of the confl icts occurs 
during election campaigns. Competition over 
political representation oft en uses both ethnic 
division to mobilise support and intra-elite 
competition at local level to manipulate long term 
primordialist social patt erns (Coppel, 2006). 
Fourth, economic approach which argue 
communal confl icts are rooted within economic 
factors such as economic rivalries and supply 
of public goods, poverty, and economic 
inequality (Mancini, 2005). The classical 
literature of communal conflict states that 
countries or regions with poorer and more 
unequal distribution of wealth are held 
to be more vulnerable to various forms of 
political violence (Stewart, 2008; Gleditsch et 
al., 2009).  The existing literature provides a 
strong theoretical foundation of how poverty 
and economic inequality lead to polarization 
of group belonging which facilitate group 
mobilization to violence collective action. For 
example, Collier & Hoeffl  er (2004) explains 
that groups that are disadvantaged in the 
distribution of resources share both a common 
grievance and a common identity, which 
facilitate recruitment for radical action to assert 
and to protect group interests.
Spatial Aspect of Communal Confl icts
Spatiality has gained increasing att ention 
within communal confl ict literature, especially 
from the perspective of space not merely as a 
static product but rather as an active agent that 
informs and aff ects inter-groups relations. The 
importance of spatiality in communal confl ict 
studies address limitation of closed polity 
approach which assumes that community 
confl ict is a function of the specifi c characteristics 
prevailing in individual communities and 
disregards the potential infl uence or regional 
factors (Sambanis, 2005). In contrast, spatial 
approach of community confl ict assumes that 
communal confl icts tend to cluster spatially in 
certain geographic areas. A number of studies 
have shown that countries in proximity to states 
involved in violent confl ict (Ward & Gleditsch, 
1998; Weidman & Ward, 2010).
Prev ious  s tudies  ident i f i ed  two 
mechanisms by which spatial may affect 
communal confl icts Ward & Gleditsch, 1998; 
Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Weidman & Ward, 
2010). First, contagious effects assume that 
communal confl icts spread through space much 
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like a disease, which potentially devastating 
consequences for human development. A 
large empirical literature documents the fact 
that communal confl icts cluster in space and 
time, so that areas close to an already existing 
confl ict are more likely to become involved 
in confl icts themselves (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 
2008). This literature had led some to conclude 
that confl icts have a propensity for contagion, 
in the sense that a communal confl ict in one 
region may bring about the onset of communal 
confl ict in a nearby region within a short time 
period. 
Second, latent effects assume that 
communal conflict clusters appear due to 
regional similarity. Hence, the geographic 
clustering of community confl icts may arise 
due to a corresponding clustering of domestic 
factors believed to promote confl ict. In this 
case, any apparent distributional pattern 
of conflict disappears due to a systematic 
fashion of domestic factors. Hegre et al. (2001) 
for example found evidence of contagion of 
confl ict from neighboring states, and conclude 
that the apparent clustering of civil war is 
fully explained by the clustering of domestic 
factors such as the absence of democratic 
institutions. Moreover, many economic shocks 
known to cause confl icts, like droughts and 
changes in commodity prices which are also 
associated with space. In this case, what looks 
like contagion might simple direct results 
of such economic shocks that aff ect a wider 
geographical area and sparked confl icts over 
a short period of time (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 
2008). 
Research Methods
Data and Variablesa. 
The Village Potential Cencus (Podes) 
2008 dataset were used to examine by which 
spatial determinants lead to communal confl ict 
across districts in Indonesia. The Podes is a 
long standing tradition of collecting data at the 
lowest administrative tier of local government. 
Podes consist of more than 7,200 villages (desa) 
and urban neighborhoods (kelurahan) across all 
465 districts in Indonesia. The census has been 
conducted every two years by the Indonesia 
Central Bureau of Statistic (Biro Pusat Statistik) 
since 1983. Detailed information is gathered 
on a range of characteristics- ranging from 
public infrastructures to village finance. 
Information is gathered from kepala desa (rural 
village heads) and lurah (urban neighborhood 
heads). Since 2003, Podes included questions 
to measure communal confl icts within village. 
In this study, we used Podes 2008 which also 
have information about communal confl icts 
and the impacts of the conflicts (fatalities, 
injuries, and material damage). Podes 2008 also 
include some information about malnutrition 
case, religion, ethnicity, migrant people, land 
converted to industry, mining areas, village 
head education, and distance from village to 
district government administration.
This study links the communal confl ict 
data from Podes 2008 with offi  cial statistics. 
First, it linked the Podes data with Gross 
Domestic Data (GDP) 2008 from the Indonesia 
Central Bureau of Statistics. Second, poverty, 
Gini Index and population data were retrieved 
from the Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Poverty was calculated from household 
expenditure questionnaires of Social Economic 
Survey (Susenas) 2008. Third, the study also 
linked the Podes 2008 data with age of local 
election data from the Ministry of Home Aff airs 
to examine whether age of local democracy 
as measured by age of local election relates 
with communal confl icts. Fourth, we retrieved 
information about existing political dynasty 
from the Ministry of Home Aff airs. Fift h, district 
balancing fund data or dana alokasi umum was 
linked to test whether fi scal decentralisation 
aff ects communal confl icts across districts. The 
district balancing fund data were retrieved from 
the Ministry of Finance. Sixth, the geographical 
areas and latitude/longitude data were used to 
examine whether districts in the borders areas 
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have higher risk to communal confl icts than 
other districts. 
Following the theoretical approaches 
which explain the prevalence of communal 
confl icts and the likelihood of it escalating into 
violence, we include four determinants which 
capture the approaches. First, Gini Index, 
poverty and malnutrition cases within a district 
are used to examine economic pathways of the 
incidence of communal conflict. Second, to 
examine ethno-cultural pathways of communal 
conflicts we include multiple religions and 
ethnic group indicators. Third, age of direct 
of local democracy, village head education 
and district balancing fund are used to test 
institutional pathways of communal confl icts. 
Fourth, existing political dynasty is included to 
test political pathways of communal confl icts. 
Local democracy in Indonesia has been 
characterised by raja-raja kecil (little king) 
which results in political dynasty within local 
government. Table 2 below shows determinants 
Table 2.
Determinants, Defi nition and Data Sources
Determinants Defi nition Sources
Communal confl ict Total number of communal confl ict within a 
district in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Gini Index District Gini Index in 2008 BPS 2008
Poverty Mean of poor people within district in 2008 BPS Susenas 2008
Log district gross 
domestic product
Logarithmic value of district gross domestic 
product in 2008
BPS 2008
Proportion of villages 
with malnutrition case
Percentage of villages within district with 
malnutrition case in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Multiple religion Percentage of villages within a district with 
more than one religion in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Multiple ethnic groups Percentage of villages within a district with 
more than one ethnicity in 2008
BPS Podes 2008
Age of direct democracy Age of direct local government election (pilkadal) 
in 2008
MoH 2008
Political dynasty District with political dynasty in 2008 MoH 2014
Log district general 
balancing fund
Logarithmic of district general balancing fund 
(dana alokasi umum) in 2008 
SIKD 2007
Close to state borders Dummy indicators indicating districts located in 
or around state border.
MoH 2008
Share migrants Percentage of migrant people on total 
population in 2008
BPS-Podes 2008
Share of urban area Percentage of urban area within a district in 
2008
BPS-Podes 2008
Land converted to 
industry
Percentage of land converted by industries 
within a district in 2008
BPS-Podes 2008
Mining area District has a mining area BPS-Podes 2008
Distance to government 
administration
Distance in kilometres between villages to 
district government administration
BPS-Podes 2008
Log population Logarithmic total number of district population 
in 2008
BPS 2008
Eastern Indonesia Eastern part of Indonesia BPS-Podes 2008
District proliferation A dummy variable indicating a proliferated 
district (pemekaran)
MoH 2008
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of communal confl icts that are included in the 
model, defi nitions and sources of data.
Geographical determinants such as district 
at and around state border, share of urban area, 
and land converted to industry are included 
to control whether geographic proximity and 
urban development relate with communal 
confl icts. Demographic determinants such as 
share of migrants and total population are 
included to control whether migration and 
population aff ect communal confl ict. Likewise, 
eastern Indonesia and district proliferation are 
included since decentralisation encourages 
local elite to create new district governments.
Statistical Analysisb. 
We applied several statistical analyses 
to describe spatial distribution of communal 
conflicts and to test whether the incidence 
of communal confl ict is contagious or latent 
issues. First, spatial descriptive analysis 
was used to describe spatial distribution 
of communal conflicts across districts in 
Indonesia. Communal conflict maps were 
created using spmap program in STATA 13.0. 
Second, in order to test whether communal 
conflicts across districts are contagious or 
latent issues, we used spatial linear regression 
analysis. We compare estimations results of 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), spatial lag and 
spatial error models in the analysis to test 
the contagious or latent issues of communal 
confl ict incidents (Bivand et al., 2008). 
Results
This section presents the results. We begin 
by presenting spatial distribution of communal 
confl icts and then present the results of spatial 
regression. 
Spatial Distribution of Communal Confl icts
Figure 1 describes spatial distribution of 
communal confl ict in Indonesia. The highest 
incidence shows at district across Papua 
province particularly districts in the border 
areas such as Jayapura, Mappi, Mamberamo 
Raya and Supiori. Most of these districts are 
new created districts which are established 
following decentralisation. High number of 
communal confl ict also occurs across districts at 
North Sumatra province such as Langkat, Deli 
Serdang, and Karo as well as Aceh province 
such as Aceh Tengah, Aceh Besar, and Aceh 
Tenggara. It also shows a dense communal 
conflict in Jakarta, capital city of Indonesia 
and Tangerang district in Banten province. 
Tangerang is also recognised as a new district 
created following decentralisation.
Figure 2 describes number of population 
death caused by communal conflict across 
Figure 1. 
Spatial Distribution of Communal Confl ict in Indonesia 2008 
Source: Podes 2008 communal confl ict data calculated by author
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districts in Indonesia 2008. The high number 
of death is showed across districts at Papua, 
particularly districts in the border areas 
such as Jayapura, Mappi, Mamberamo Raya, 
Yahukimo, and Supiori. A high number of 
deaths are also showed at some districts at 
Central Sulawesi and North Sumatra. 
Not only death, communal conflict 
also results in material lost. Figure 3 shows 
geographical distribution of material lost 
due to communal confl ict across districts in 
Indonesia. The highest number of material 
lost occurs at districts across East Papua, some 
districts at North Sumatra, Aceh, and West 
Java province. However, we do not find a 
substantial material loss of communal confl ict 
at Kalimantan province and some district at 
Central Java, Yogyakarta and southern part of 
East Java province.
Determinants of Communal Confl icts
Table 3 shows regression results of 
political, institutional, economic and ethno-
cultural determinants of communal confl icts in 
Indonesia. The coeffi  cient of OLS, spatial error, 
and spatial lag estimation show consistent 
Figure 2.
Spatial Distribution of Total Death Caused by Communal Confl ict in Indonesia 2008
    Source: Podes 2008 communal confl ict data calculated by author
Figure 3.
Spatial Distribution of Material Lost (In Million Rupiah) Due to Communal 
Confl ict in Indonesia 2008
     Source: Podes 2008 communal confl ict data calculated by author
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results. Gini Index shows positive association 
with number of communal confl ict indicating 
the detrimental effect of district economic 
inequality on confl ict. Likewise, districts with 
high number of poverty and malnutrition are 
likely risks to communal confl ict. However, 
log district GDP has positive relationship with 
communal confl ict indicating that communal 
confl icts likely occurs in rich districts rather 
than in poor districts. Multiple religion and 
ethnic groups have negative association with 
communal confl ict. However, the results show 
not significance, meaning that religion and 
ethnic heterogeneity seem not risk factors 
of community conflict across districts in 
Indonesia. 
Political dynasty increases communal 
confl icts. In all models, it shows a signifi cant 
association between districts with political 
dynasty and higher number of communal 
conflicts. Age of direct democracy leads to 
communal confl ict but the relationship is not 
signifi cant. Street level bureaucracy capacity 
as measured by village head education is 
negatively associated with communal confl ict. 
However, fi scal decentralisation as measured 
by district balancing fund increases communal 
confl icts. Migration and districts located close 
Table 3.
Regression Results of Communal Confl ict in Indonesia 2008
OLS Spatial Error Spatial Lag
Coef. se Coef. se Coef. se
Gini index 40.813*** 13.291 38.183*** 12.481 42.764*** 13.157
Poverty 12.495*** 3.646 12.022*** 3.634 12.201*** 3.596
Log district gross domestic 
product
1.727*** 0.439 1.623*** 0.448 1.752*** 0.432
Proportion of villages with 
malnutrition case
0.700*** 0.103 0.699*** 0.102 0.695*** 0.102
Multiple religion -1.715 1.787 -1.832 1.767 -1.949 1.767
Multiple ethnic groups -6.652 2.671 -6.562 2.641 -6.474 2.632
Political dynasty 2.450*** 0.231 2.402*** 0.211 2.285*** 0.200
Age of direct democracy 5.452 2.472 0.102 0.356 0.085 0.356
Village head education: 
high school and above
-1.410*** 0.111 -1.312*** 0.100 -1.215*** 0.090
Log district balancing fund 0.012*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.002
Close to state borders 0.248 0.165 0.217 0.153 0.269 0.141
Share migrants 0.068 0.266 0.052 0.233 0.061 0.212
Share of urban area 5.350*** 1.548 4.250*** 1.328 4.310*** 1.310
Land converted to industry 1.546*** 0.025 1.326*** 0.021 1.421*** 0.018
Mining area 3.014 2.987 2.015 2.147 2.112 2.141
Distance to government 
administration
2.146*** 0.037 2.116*** 0.034 2.421*** 0.021
Log population 2.328*** 0.503 2.327*** 0.504 2.427*** 0.401
Eastern Indonesia 2.621*** 0.012 2.531*** 0.011 2.611*** 0.010
District proliferation 1.321*** 0.022 1.211*** 0.011 1.221*** 0.010
Constant -46.967*** 12.437 -42.377*** 13.442 -49.284*** 12.737
R 19%
Rho 0.0272 0.019
Lambda 0.881*** 0.006
Reported ***p < 0.01
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to state border have high risk to communal 
confl ict. However, this association appears not 
signifi cant.  Urbanisation and industrialisation 
both increase to communal confl ict. Likewise, 
distance to government administration, 
population and district proliferation triggers 
communal conflict. As expected, districts 
located at Eastern part of Indonesia have higher 
risk to communal confl ict.   
Results of spatial error model shows 
significant relationship of latent factors 
(λ=0.881, ***p < 0.01). However, results of spatial 
lag model shows insignificant relationship 
(p=0.0272, p > 0.1) meaning that communal 
confl ict in one district do not trigger confl ict 
in their neighbouring districts. Otherwise, 
the signifi cant results of spatial error model 
indicate that confl ict in one particular district 
is likely result in from latent factors within the 
districts.
Analysis 
This paper aims to examine spatial aspects 
of sub-national communal confl ict and its risk 
factors in Indonesia. The main results show 
that the incidence of communal conflict in 
Indonesia to be spatially dependent through 
latent factors, meaning that communal confl ict 
clusters due to clustering of latent factors at 
district level. In contrast with many qualitative 
fi ndings, we do not fi nd empirical evidence of 
contagious eff ect of communal confl ict in the 
country (Klinken, 2007; Urwasi, 2015). 
This study shows three main pathways 
in which communal confl icts escalate across 
districts. First, communal conflict between 
districts occurs due to endemic problems 
of poverty and economic inequality across 
districts. The empirical evidence shows that 
communal conflict occurs within poorer 
districts and districts with higher Gini Index. 
These results confirm classical literature of 
communal confl icts which provides a strong 
foundation of economic pathway of community 
confl ict escalation. Stewart (2008) for instance 
highlight that regions with poorer and more 
unequal distribution of wealth are held to be 
more vulnerable to communal confl icts. 
Second, communal conflict between 
districts escalates due to weaknesses of district 
democratic institutions and lack capacity of 
street level bureaucracy. As we found that risks 
of communal confl ict appear within districts 
which have less capacity of village head and 
immature local democracy.  These results 
confi rm the work of institutional pathways in 
understanding communal confl ict in Indonesia. 
Baron et al. (2009), Tajima et al. (2004) and Risa 
(2016), for example, found that clashed within 
communities oft en occurs due to the absence 
of a formal rule of law and lack of capacity of 
local leaders and state institution to enforce 
decision.
Third, communal confl ict between districts 
in Indonesia also occurs due to political reason. 
The political competition during direct local 
election gives a reason for communal confl icts. 
In many cases, political competition over 
political representation uses ethnic division to 
mobilise support and intra-elite competition at 
district to manipulate long terms elite capture 
(Klinken, 2007).  The rise of raja-raja kecil (litt le 
king) and dinasti politik (political dynasty) in 
local level following political decentralisation 
support this evidence.  As also shows in this 
study that district with exist political dynasty 
have higher risks to community confl icts.
Another important findings show that 
rather than religious and ethnic heterogeneity, 
communal confl ict across districts is positively 
associated with poverty, economic inequality 
and weak capacity of districts to manage fi scal 
resources. In all models, we found no signifi cant 
association between religious and ethnic 
heterogeneity and the incidence of communal 
conflict. In contrast, a strong association is 
showed on the relation between economic, 
political and institutional factors of communal 
conflict. The significant association of these 
factors contrast with prior studies that strongly 
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argue that religion and ethnic heterogeneity are 
the main determinants of communal confl ict in 
the country (see for example, Klinken, 2007). 
Instead of religion and ethnic heterogeneity, this 
study shows that lack capacity of street level 
bureaucrats, immature local democracy, political 
dynasty, poverty and economic inequality are 
roots issue of communal confl ict across districts 
in the country. 
This study also found that decentralisation 
increases the incidence of communal confl ict 
through lack capacity of district government in 
managing fi scal resources. Decentralisation has 
transferred abundant fi scal resources to from 
central government to district government. 
With poor capacity of district government 
in managing fi scal resources, in many cases 
the resources do not give benefits to local 
people and therefore triggering communal 
confl ict. Klinken (2007) for example noted that 
communal confl ict incidence oft en occurs at 
eastern part of Indonesia which most of them 
have lack capacity to manage resource. As 
also seen from this study, communal confl ict 
incidents are strongly related with new districts 
government which most of them still have lack 
capacity to manage fi scal resources.  
There are two limitations of these studies. 
First, this study is based on cross-sectional 
data so that it only provides one shot capture 
of communal confl ict in Indonesia. Therefore, 
the future studies may useful to examine risk 
factors of communal confl ict in the country 
using longer time of data. Second, the statistical 
analysis used in this study is unable to account 
the structure of Podes data which is based on 
village rather than on district. Future studies 
therefore are useful using multilevel spatial 
modelling to account for heterogeneity across 
villages within district (see for example, 
Morenoff  & Simpson, 1997).
Despite these limitations, this study 
has several important implications on the 
communal conflict literature in developing 
countries particularly Indonesia as well as 
policy to solve community confl ict. First, the 
significant findings of spatial error model 
imply that the root issues of communal 
confl ict in decentralised Indonesia are latent 
issues within districts particularly increasing 
poverty, economic inequality, paternalism 
and primordialism following political 
decentralisation in the country. From policy 
perspective, therefore, the politicians and 
government should notice that sooner or later 
the widespread of issues such as paternalism 
and primordialism in the country as manifested 
by increasing politik dinasti (political dynasty) 
will lead to communal confl ict.  Second, the 
signifi cant fi nding of political, institutional and 
economic risk factors confi rms prior studies 
across developing countries that the source of 
widespread of communal confl ict in developing 
countries is acute problems of elite capture, 
weak institution, and poverty (see for example 
Murshed 2009; World Bank 2011; UNDP, 2011). 
These findings highlight the importance of 
strengthening local government capacity, local 
democratic institution and poverty reduction 
to combat communal confl icts. For Indonesia, 
improving local government capacity especially 
in managing fi scal resources to reduce poverty 
and to increase inclusive growth that benefi t 
for both rich and poor people across the 
archipelago may be a strategic pathway.
Conclusion
In decentralised Indonesia, communal 
conflict to be spatially dependent through 
latent factors, meaning that communal confl ict 
clusters because of clustering of latent factors 
within district. Rather than religious and ethnic 
heterogeneity, communal confl ict is positively 
associated with poverty, economic inequality, 
elite capture, and weak capacity of districts 
to manage fiscal resources. These findings 
highlight the importance of strengthening 
local government capacity, local democratic 
institution and poverty reduction to combat 
communal confl icts across archipelago.
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